“The Growth of International Organizations in the Modern Times Proves the Redundancy of Realist Theory” - Discussion

“International Institutions have become an increasingly common phenomenon of international life” . Today in this highly globalized world, most nation states are bound by various international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World bank and the United Nations. Not only are the numbers of institutions increasing, their role is growing. Indeed, Europe is experiencing the most “Extensive and well-developed” institution, binding countries and removing a part of each nations sovereignty. This phenomenon is highly contrary to the predictions made once by Mearsheimer that “the EC is likely [due to the end of the Cold War] to grow weaker, not stronger with time” and his prediction that NATO would disintegrate because “it is the Soviet Threat that holds NATO together” . Because of such pessimism portrayed by the realists, and with the growth in international organizations, neoliberal institutionalists have made the claim that the realist theory is becoming redundant. Massive debate about this subject has occurred between Mearsheimer and Crieco in the realist school of thought and Keohane, Axelrod and Scully in the neoliberal school of thought. In this particular debate the realist thinkers are generally of the opinion that realism is not in any shape or form redundant, in fact they claim that it is more powerful today. On the other hand the neoliberal institutionalists dispute that the realist theory is no longer explaining what is happening with interstate relations worldwide. This paper will attempt to discuss both sides of the debate in order to conclude if in fact the realist theory has become redundant today. It will hopefully become apparent that both theories are able to account for their “sides of the coin” to a high extent.

Before the debate can be discussed, it is important to briefly explain my reasoning for basing this paper on neoliberal institutionalism. After research, it becomes evident that the most “influential contemporary approach to international relations theory are neorealism and neoliberalism” . Indeed, Powell has accepted that a common place for an article “about some aspect of international relations theory to begin” is on this very debate between realism and neoliberalism. Also, Joseph Crieco has said that “the major challenger to realism has been what I shall call liberal institutionalism.” Hence it was only appropriate to try to examine this question with these two theories.

Realism has been characterized by many as grim and pessimistic. In fact, Wendt wrote that:

“Realism paints a rather grim picture of world politics. The international system is portrayed as a brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other, and therefore have little reason to trust each other. Daily life is essentially a struggle for power, where each state strives not only to be the most powerful actor in the system, but also to ensure that no other state achieves that lofty position”.

Being such a distrusting regime, it is true that the chance for cooperation, especially in an international sphere, becomes quite rare. However, realists like Crieco and Mearsheimer who have written specifically on realist theory on cooperation, are still of the opinion that there is a chance for cooperation if certain conditions are met. If these conditions are not met, an institution may still be formed, but its chances for disintegration will massively increase. This section will aim to discuss what realists think are the vital factors that allow cooperation to occur in order to suggest that realism is not redundant. Indeed, Crieco and Mearsheimer are grand supporters that realism prevails “the most powerful theory of international relations” . The arguments used by realists suggest that cooperation and the formation of international institutions comes down to a state’s self interest.

The first argument used by realists is that “States in a realist world...must be motivated primarily by relative gains concerns when considering cooperation” . What is meant by this is that the primary goal of states is not to make sure they achieve the best they possibly can from an institution, the goal is “to prevent others from achieving advances in their relative capabilities” . In the opinion of a realist, even if the state is losing in an organization, this doesn’t matter if the other contenders are doing worse. In fact, joining an institution, in the eyes of a realist is done simply to make sure one does better than the other nations. Indeed, “A state will decline to join, will leave, or will sharply limit its commitment to a cooperative arrangement if it believes that gaps in otherwise mutually positive gains favour partners” . Furthermore, J. Crieco also wrote an article about ways in which realism allows for cooperation, and he explained that sometimes one must join an international institution because of the consequences which follow if one does not. Crieco makes a reference to the scenario where if a state does not cooperate with others, “they may work together and gain even greater relative advantage over you than they might otherwise” .

The second point which is made by scholars like Mearsheimer, is that states may join institutions in order to secure the balance of power. In fact, “for realists, institutions reflect state calculations of self-interest based primarily on concerns about relative power; as a result, institutional outcomes invariably reflect the balance of power” . This is demonstrated by the UN for instance. In the UN the most important members are part of the Security Council, which inevitably means they carry more powers, since the Security Council tackles the most pressing issues. On the other hand, other less powerful nations only have membership in the general assembly which means that they only have a say in issues which aren’t in retrospect as important. Additionally, in the Security Council the big five, which consists of France, the United Kingdom, China, USA and the USSR, have Veto power. It is fair to suggest that it represents the balance of power of the time in which the UN was founded. Moreover, “realists recognize that great powers sometimes find institutions ... useful for maintaining or even increasing their share of the world power.” Indeed, Britain and France, who are no longer seen as superpowers were able to secure the balance of power of the late 1940’s to a high extent with the use of the United Nations. Helen Milner wrote about realism and the balance of power and concluded that “states will cooperate to counterbalance others whose relative power is growing” . This is supported with the United States and other European states in balancing against the soviets through NATO . This is further suggested by Snidal who wrote that “the less well united ones enemies, the safer on is.”

These are the two main arguments which are made by Mearsheimer and other realists to ensure that the realist thought is still the primary international relations theory. As one can deduct from the points said above, cooperation in the realist world comes down to self interest: The self interest may be securing the balance of power, or achieving better than other nations, or a countries security. De facto “when state elites do not foresee self-interested benefits from cooperation, we do not expect cooperation to occur” . To conclude the first side of the debate, the realists think their theory is more rounded then the theory of neoliberal institutionalism. The realists stress that there are two main restrictions to inter-state cooperation: The concern about cheating, and relative gains. “neoliberal institutionalism pays attention exclusively to the former, and is unable to identify, analyze, or account for the latter.” Mearsheimer attacks the neoliberal institutionalist school of thought of underestimating “the barriers to cooperation in the anarchic international system, in particular the inhibiting effect of relative-gains concerns”. By including such factors as relative gains into the formula, and by still being able to account for the growth in international institutions, the realists claim to be the mainstream theory in international relations today.

Realists have definitely supported and defended their position. However, the growth in international institutions does beg the question: how is it that institutions are growing at the rate that they are if the realist thought is correct. Particularly since the realist thought still claims that “international institutions affect the prospects of cooperation only marginally” . Neoliberal institutionalists argue that realists are not entirely correct. “The debate between neorealist’s and neoliberals has been based on the shared commitment to rationalism” and a shared belief that the international system has an anarchic nature. However, the two schools of thought differ in that neoliberal institutionalists aren’t as pessimistic as the realist theory and support cooperation with absolute gains instead of relative gains. This side of the debate is led by Scully, Keohane and Martin. Keohane and Martin have asked a defining question: “how are we to account for the willingness of major states to invest resources in expanding international institutions if such institutions are lacking in significance?” . In other words, they believe that the growth of international institutions is supporting their claim that “ even if the realists are correct in believing that anarchy constraints the willingness of states to cooperate, states nevertheless can work together and can do so especially with the assistance of international institutions” . The neoliberal institutionalists critique about the realist thought being redundant isn’t limited to the obvious fact that the there is a growth in international organizations. According to neoliberal institutionalists, there are further factors, which mark the termination of realist theory in international relations.

The first of these factors is the extreme pessimism of the realist theory which disables it from recognizing “the possibilities for international cooperation and the capacities of international institutions” . Firstly, in realism as in neoliberal institutionalism there is a concern about cheating. However, neoliberals generally argue that the fear of a partner cheating can be lowered with the aid of institutions. Indeed, Keohane has claimed that generally institutions “make it more sensible to cooperate by lowering the likelihood of being double-cross” . A common proposition of how this happens is since there is an increase in the information available about each state, and hence more transparency, this “reduces the likelihood that states will cheat on established agreements or norms.” Also, because of this transparency and increased information, and the agreements on rules, It is “easier to punish cheaters.” Crieco and Axelrod attempt to explain this: “international regimes do not substitute for reciprocity; rather, they reinforce and institutionalize it”, which means there are some rules in the playing field and it is therefore harder for countries to cheat. Lastly on this point of cheating, there are neoliberal instituionalists who think that the fear of cheating is worked out as in the prisoner’s dilemma. They explain that “states may pursue a strategy of tit-for-tat and cooperate on a conditional basis- that is, each adheres to its promises so long as partners do so.” Secondly, unlike for realism, neoliberal institutionalists do not take notice of relative gains in cooperation. However, they are of the opinion that just as institutions are able to “mitigate fears of cheating and so allow cooperation to emerge” , institutions can hypothetically lessen the fears which are associated with relative gains concerns. Neoliberal institutionalists infrequently and with less detail explain how this can occur, nonetheless, they make reference to the occasions in which “institutions led states to behave in a more cooperative manner than they otherwise might have” , which dampened relative gains concerns.

The second factor which suggests the end of realism in international relations on the subject of institutions and cooperation follows the discussion from above about relative gains. As explained above, neoliberal institutionalists think about absolute gains rather than relative gains when it comes to cooperation. Cooperation in the eyes of neoliberal institutionalists can only occur if there are shared mutual interests . Once countries are bound by an international cooperation where there are such shared common aspects, the interests of a state is thereafter to succeed absolute gains. Robert Powell explicates:

“Neoliberal institutionalism assumes that states focus primarily on their individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains of others. Whether cooperation results in a relative gain or loss is not very important to a state in neoliberal institutionalism so long as it brings an absolute gain”

Robert Powell is of the opinion that absolute gains unlike relative gains “emphasizes the prospects for cooperation” . This is because states which are concerned with relative gains will perceive the gains of another nation to be a loss for oneself and this will make it harder to cooperate positively and to achieve anything substantial and without considerable tensions. Additionally, absolute gains shifts the aim of states from competing for better results than its partners to just getting the best one can from cooperation: which henceforth allows for a successful cooperation. According to various neoliberal institutionalists, the UN wouldn’t have survived if nation-states were constantly calculating the relative gains to others. It is a known fact that different nations get different outcomes out of the UN, including a range of different powers. Developing countries like Zimbabwe and even developed countries like Germany don’t get as many powers as the United States of America or Britain. So, if nation states would be following the realist concern with relative gains, surely the UN wouldn’t have survived for as long as it has, through highly intense times like the Cold War.

To bring to a close, there are three major arguments portrayed by the neoliberal institutionalists which expresses their opinion of the redundancy of realist theory. The first argument was the obvious questioning of the realist thought on the grounds of ever growing international organizations. The second critique was towards realist pessimism and its blinding ability: for realists aren’t able to see the possibilities for international cooperation. The third and last argument was about absolute gains versus relative gains: how absolute gains render cooperation. One must conclude the second side of the debate with a final quote of Keohane: “realism’s insistence that institutions have only marginal effects renders its account of institutional creation incomplete and logically unsound, and leaves it without a plausible account of the investments that states have made in such international institutions as the EU, NATO, GATT, and regional trading organizations.”

Is the realist theory relevant today? It is interesting to attempt to answer this question with reference to both neoliberal institutionalism and the realist theory; because the former is relatively new. In fact it arguably was born with the writing of Keohane around two decades ago. The latter on the other hand has been around for longer and has hence been further developed. I think that it is important to recognize that the theories have been developed at different times, because it is reflected on the answer to the debate. I am of the opinion that the realist thought is to a high extent still relevant today: I think that realists are correct in their assumption about institutions reflecting the balance of power. This happens because power is generally distributed according to power and size of nations, as it is done in the UN and EU. Also, many a times it is the more developed nations which create such institutions: this was done in the League of Nations for instance. I also agree that states will not join an institution if it does not aid in securing its own interests. Moreover, it is harder to discuss the relative gains arguments versus absolute gains because both schools of thought have defended their opinions to a great extent. I agree that cooperation with relative gains concerns happens when the more powerful states want to secure their part of world power, and hence are concerned with up and coming nations. However, I also agree cooperation with absolute gains concerns occurs with most developing and weaker developed nations, who just aim to succeed the best they possibly can: neoliberal institutionalists demonstrate this with the UN example mentioned earlier. Furthermore, what leads one to question the realist thought is the extreme pessimism which doesn’t match up to the growth of international organizations. On the other hand, neoliberal institutionalism seems rather new, and has many incomplete analysis´s , but is able to account for the growth in institutions. This question will be an interesting one to answer with the further development of institutions and with the further development of both theories hand in hand. Overall, it seems too harsh a statement to claim that realism in international relations is redundant.

The Politicians Tea Party

I had a bizarre day-dream a few years ago that I was Alice in Wonderland and I stumbled into the "mad Tea Party". What was Bizarre was that the party wasn't hosted by the Hatter or the Dormouse, I was joined by politicians and historical figures such as Stalin, George W. Bush, Putin. In my dream they were all having cakes and tea and having "mad" political conversations and debates which had no sound arguments and in all sounded ridiculous. It was just like the "mad tea party"- I woke up to realize that my dream wasn't far off from reality, and that the guests at the tea party in my dream have at times said the most craziest things:

Bush: "I'm going to try to see if I can remember as much to make it sound like I'm smart on the subject"

Stalin: "Death is a solution to all problems. No man- no problem"

Putin: "the strengthening of our statehood is, at times, deliberately interpreted as authoritarianism"

Condoleezza Rice: "Punish France, ignore Germany, and forgive Russia"

Fidel Castro: "I never saw a contradiction between the ideas that sustain me and the ideas of that symbol, of that extraordinary figure, Jesus Crist"

Hitler: "Male a lie big, make it simple, keep saying it, and eventually they will believe it"

Hugo Chavez: "I hereby accuse the North American Empire of being the Biggest menace to our planet"

Such "mad" talk has come from our world leaders and inspired me to do a art piece a couple years back titled The Politicians Tea Party. In that piece politicians are sitting around a table enjoying a tea party and talking the mad talk expressed above in the quotes. The last quote visible in the art piece is a quote from the book Alice in Wonderland :

Alice: "At any rate I'll never go there again!... it's the stupidest tea-party I ever was at in all my life!"

“Interest groups have replaced political parties as the mainstream institution linking citizens and government” - Discussion

Interest groups and parties are associations which aim to represent the public- the main difference between the two is that “interest groups are policy maximizers, while political parties are focused on maximizing the numbers of seats they win in congress” . In the 1960s and 1970s many scholars like David Broder studied and wrote about what was then known as the ‘D’ word . The ‘D’ word was directed at the decline and disappearance of parties in the United States. These claims were formed on the basis that party membership was quickly declining and that partisanship was even more so . Since then, parties have recovered . However, there have been similar signs of party decline since the early 1990s. Scholars like Verba and Fiorina argue that membership and partisanship has declined because parties represent only a small fraction of the American population. Moreover, the number of pressure groups, their membership and their influence has increased , which strongly suggests that perhaps interest groups have, or are close to replacing the role of parties in linking society to the government. This essay will discuss the question by assessing both sides of the coin. Firstly, arguments which propose interest groups are more effective at representation will be analyzed, and in the second part of this essay arguments which suggest that parties are still the mainstream institution linking citizens and government will be discussed. It will become apparent, that there is stronger evidence supporting the argument that the role of interest groups has definitely moved towards being a stronger weapon of representation for the people, especially for the minorities and the worse off in society, however, parties will still remain a necessary institution for stability and overall representation.

There has been major debate about the extent to which the two major parties in America represent the American population. According to scholars Wattenberg and Greenberg “the two major parties are no longer as central as they once were in tying peoples everyday concerns to their choices in the political system” . Hence people have been trying to find alternative ways in which to participate in politics and voice their opinions. Simultaneously, membership of pressure groups has increased and their impact has become significantly augmented. Could it be that pressure groups are becoming the new mainstream institutions linking citizens and government? This first section of the essay will display arguments used to proclaim that parties are weakening in their ability to link the electorates to the government and also that Interest groups are growing in their ability to represent their members.

There is a common notion that pressure groups are limited to a high extent when it comes to influencing policy. However, according to the academic A. Turner, who wrote about how pressure groups work , their influence is growing. Today, they not only influence people with their campaigns, but they also arguably influence the legislative, executive and even the judiciary sectors of government to a high extent. It is important to acknowledge that it is obviously harder for the pressure groups to influence government. This is because they cannot join in the debates on issues and pragmatically voice their opinions in Congress. Instead interest groups have other persuasive means like providing legislators “with facts, information, and arguments” by letters, telegraphs, private meetings, lobbying etc. In fact “organized groups utilize every available opportunity to inform legislators of their wishes.” Evidently it is much harder trying to influence policy with these methods, however it is possible. Indeed, “available information indicates that pressure associations originate a large percentage of the Bills Introduced in congress and the state legislature.” Furthermore, interest associations have also managed to influence the executive branch, and this arguably is “one of the most noteworthy changes in pressure group activity” in this last century. Again, like for influencing the legislature, interest groups send the executive chiefs, letters and statements and so forth, to recommend to the president and governors, to “incorporate or omit specific proposals from their legislative programs” . Moreover, pressure groups also seek to influence the judiciary, however this happens in rare occasions. This is done by “initiating litigation to test the constitutionality of legislation on the action of public officials” . An example of a pressure group which almost solely used this method is the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, whose aim was to defend Negro rights. Even though pressure groups do not impact policy in the traditional sense, they definitely do influence government, so one could argue that pressure groups are a strong contender to parties.

Burham wrote in 1989 that parties today “seem chiefly to be associated with… massive decay of partisan electoral linkages to the population” . The words of Bur ham lead us to the argument of the ever weakening ability of parties to represent society. There are two main schools of thought that suggest Burham’s theory. Both schools are of the opinion that the function of a party to focus “on maximizing the numbers of seats they win in congress” is their limit to represent the society because they are too concentrated on the pursuit of election. The first school of thought is a Downsian argument about parties basing their policies on both sides of the center of the political spectrum, “where most voters are massed”, in order to represent the median voter. Anthony Downs also recognizes that the parties from both left and right sides of the political spectrum do "sprinkle these moderate policies with a few extreme stands in order to please its far-out voters,” . Because both the Democratic and Republican parties in America are trying to represent the median voters, the parties are becoming more alike and hence are distancing themselves from minorities. Noticeably they aren’t as ideologically alike as their British counterparts (the labour and Conservative Parties) for “in most contests there is a considerable ideological distance between Democratic and Republican Candidates” . Moreover, The second school of thought is shared by the American Political Science Association and it contends that the alienation of certain members in society is occurring because of the fact that “Modern campaigns for the US congress require significant sums of money in order to be reasonably competent.” The predicament with money being the ‘oxygen’ of modern day elections “is where the money comes from and the influence it buys” . Campaigns do not only focus on the median voter, they also focus on the most affluent of society in order to gain funding for their race. This is because “95% of the donors who made substantial contributions were in the wealthiest households” . This means that the better off in society have a way of voicing their opinions that is unattainable for most of the population. The American Political Science Association concluded from their study about Parties and their Ability to represent the public that:

“Citizens with lower or moderate income speak with a whisper that is lost on the ears of inattentive government officials, while the advantaged roar with a clarity and consistency that policy makers readily hear and routinely follow”

The conclusion is to a great extent, but not solely based on the fact that as richer people donate money, candidates take them more into consideration. The problem is that today only 50 percent of people vote, and of those 50 percent, most are people with higher income than 75 000 a year : 1/3 of lower income families vote, whilst 9/10 of higher income families vote. This means that there is a great fraction of the population who is not being considered when it comes to policy making by the parties. There are definitely strong arguments, which are suggested by research done by various political researchers, that the two main parties today are not representing the American society. In regards to all said above, people are finding other means of representation like demonstrations and joining pressure groups like the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the National Federation of Independent Business and the National Right to Life Committee to seek representation.

There are definitely significant arguments which strongly suggest that pressure groups do represent the people and may be becoming a new mainstream institution linking citizens and government. However, as we move into the second part of this essay we will examine arguments that parties are still the conventional institution, and even if pressure groups would become more popularized with extreme ideological people and minorities feeling alienated, interest groups will not replace the position of parties. Firstly, the differences between pressure associations and parties in representing the population and their power will be briefly highlighted with the aim of showing that pressure groups have not and cannot replace parties as a representing mechanism. Lastly, it will be argued that membership decline is an irrelevant point of reference when criticizing the party as a non representative institution.

According to most theories “in a modern, complex society parties are a necessary link in the relationship between government and people” . The first reason why a party can be seen as a necessary mechanism is that unlike interest groups, parties represent a broader image of society. One defining “characteristic of both the Democrats and the Republicans is that they have constantly sought to appeal to as wide a spectrum of voters as possible”, hence they offer their supporters “very general and diffuse policy options”. Additionally, one could characterize both parties for the most part as being extremely inclusive and non-ideological . Pressure groups on the other hand are in most cases associations which focus on issues, or groups in societies like teachers, and doctors for instance. The benefit of parties having a broad but complex agenda, is that they have a bigger opportunity of representing the society as a whole. The second reason why parties are a required mechanism for representation is that pressure groups lack the necessary power to influence. When a president from a party is elected, he appoints “government officials to fill the major posts in the new administration. Not only departmental chiefs, but also the top civil service” . Because party members are appointed such great positions, they have more power to actually implement policy, and make sure that citizens are being represented. Indeed, “today, the Republican and Democratic parties dominate the political process. With rare exceptions, the two major parties control the presidency, the congress, the governorships, and the state legislatures” . It is undeniable that pressure groups do influence government to a high extent, however they have to rely on lobbyists, letters, phone calls and even on threats of punishing or rewarding governors and legislators, “by giving or withholding support at the polls” . The third point to make is that parties are a great mechanism of representation because they can be held accountable. “According to social-contract theory, governments must be held accountable for their actions” in order to be fully representative. The last point to be mentioned is that “staffing the government through party helps to ensure an intimate link between the implementation of policies and public preference”.

There seems to be a common notion that citizens aren’t represented by the parties, and this notion is explained with the membership decline that has occurred in the last 15 years (6.1% for the democrats and by 1.08% for the republicans ). However, this notion has been argued by various different academics like Paul Whiteley, to be nothing but an illusion or a myth which is broadcasted by students of parties- because political scientists today do not clearly understand the concept of parties. In fact, J. Schlesinger said that “Students of parties have never even come to an agreement on what a political party is, much less on how to tell whether one is strong or weak, decaying or blossoming“ . Whiteley is of the opinion that parties may “be losing their activists and members because of the rise of relatively new forms of political participation” . There seems to be a change from the traditional participation to informal participation. The traditional participation refers to voting at elections, and to being a member of a party. The informal participation on the other hand refers to joining political forums and chat rooms, signing electronic petitions, and even “buying or boycotting goods for political or ethical reasons” . Whitely blames the internet and the consumer society for transforming the participation from the formal to the informal type, which results in the lowering of party membership and even turnout. This argument suggests that parties are not disappearing and aren’t less representative, instead, society has changed mind set and hence people are less likely to join a party or vote at elections and more likely to stay at home at their computers and participate in a new virtual sense.

To finally conclude on the question of whether interest groups have replaced political parties as the mainstream institution linking citizens and government- it is important to understand that there are arguments for and against this claim, and hence the answer is subjective and can be intertwined. As it was made evident, both parties and interest groups have their own benefits and their own constraints when it comes to representing citizens. The limit of parties is their pursuit of elections and the alienation it provides. The limit of pressure groups is how narrow they are and their lack of power to influence. I think that both pressure groups and parties are the cause for their own limitations - the fact that parties are meant to influence a broad society and hence the median man, means that some people (usually minorities and the worst off in society) are being distanced. Also, pressure groups have a limit to their influence because they choose to be associations which simply aim to influence government and not be a part of government. I am of the opinion that parties will not disappear as they are a necessary institution which represents the broad picture of American population and they dominate and run the political system. “The problem today is that this mechanism for a broad and inclusive democracy –political parties- caters to some of the same narrow segments of American Society.” Because of this I also think that the number of pressure groups could hypothetically rise with the growing number of unrepresented people. Overall, because of this dilemma, I think both institutions are important for different types of representation.

Do we live in an age of empire?

The study of imperialism has evolved tremendously in the last century: it has become a study which has increasingly moved away from analyzing old legendary empires such as the Roman Empire, and now focus on nations such as Modern Japan, China, Europe and above all the USA. Indeed, theorists of the Marxist and Realist realm of thought have been obsessed with the idea of the USA as the leading Empire in the 20th and 21st century . The question to be analyzed in this essay is whether we live in an age of empire? This question will be discussed by looking at various theories of international relations. The first part of this essay will attempt to argue that Imperialism prevails, and the second part will attempt to counter argue with thinkers such as Robert Cox and Stephen Gill. It will become apparent that the answer to this question depends on whether one believes the primary actors within the international system are states or institutions.

Firstly, even before the discussion can be initiated, it is important to explain what is meant by the term imperialism in this essay. “Imperialism can be defined very broadly or very narrowly” , where the narrow definitions commit themselves to political ideologies. Because this essay will touch various different regimes this essay will use a rather simplistic yet explanatory definition by Johan Galtung. Galtung in his journal A structural Theory of Imperialism defines the concept in terms of center periphery relations: where the “center nation has power over the periphery nation, so as to bring about a condition of disharmony of interest between them.” In order to completely understand the definition it is important to bear in mind that there are two types of imperialism- formal and informal. These two types differentiate imperialism of the past and what one considers imperialism of the modern age to be. Hereby formal imperialism refers to the center nation influencing power on its colonies and informal imperialism refers to the center nation influencing a region (or a particular country) in the military, social and commercial sense . This essay will be concentrating on informal imperialism since with the change in world order there are not many colonies in the traditional sense.

Marxists and realists argue for different reasons that imperialism is an inevitable process. In short, Marxists argue that imperialism occurs alongside or as a result of capitalism, while on the other hand realists dispute that the wish to dominate is enshrined in human nature and is an impulse to states. Even though these views are radically different, they hold that the state is a primary actor and that we live in an age of imperialism.

Imperialism in the Marxist sphere is generally described by the famous subtitle of Lenin’s work: “the highest stage of capitalism” . In brief, this phrase refers to a specific point in the capitalist development where a nation has reached its peak in what it can generate within its state territory. At this peak the state is obliged by capitalist momentum to expand to other nations to continue its capitalist path in yielding further profit. Karl Kautsky explains this in his book Marxism, Revolution & Democracy: Imperialism as “the drive of every industrial capitalist nation to subject and attach to itself an ever growing agrarian territory regardless of what nations inhabit it” . Not only is imperialism the next step once a capitalist state reaches the peak in home productions but any predominant nation in commerce and industry feels forced to continue to “seek markets, and, where possible, to control the to its own advantage” . As a matter of fact, Rosa Luxembourg thinks that there is an unavoidable logical cycle in capitalism: Industry, Markets, Control, navy bases . This cycle, in the Marxist view point inescapably leads to either formal or informal imperialism. Moreover, Lenin believed that the capitalist state would attach itself to less economically developed countries (LEDC’s) instead of more economically developed countries (MEDC’s) because labor and capital are inexpensive and hence more profit can be generated. However modern Marxists are of the opinion that a capitalist state is as likely to expand into MEDC’s because they are more reliable investments. Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy who have studied modern capitalist imperialism, portray foreign investment and humanitarianism as imperialism. They maintain that "foreign investment must be looked upon as a method of pumping surplus out of underdeveloped areas, not as a channel through which surplus is directed into them."' In other words, foreign investment and humanitarianism is an underhanded imperialistic way of profiting.

Unlike from Marxism, the realist theory propagates the idea of power politics; which perceives state security, survival and national interests as the most important factors to the state. Even though realists have a different view from Marxists about imperialism, they are the same in that they believe in the inevitability of imperialism today. Indeed scholars like Hans Morgenthau are of the opinion that the concept is inevitable because it is the result of human nature. Morgenthau affirms that “the drives to live, to propagate, and to dominate are common to all men” . Morgenthau also claims that these human natural impulses are related to imperialism: “the tendency to dominate… is an element of all human associations… as such it foreshadows the conflict between the policies of the status quo and the policies of imperialism” . This analysis is shared by Reinhold Niebuhr who believes that men are driven by the will to power because we are “tainted by original sin, driven by pride and insecurity” . Niebuhr explains that because the human nature incentivizes people to be power driven and power searching the world politics as a whole works with the same frame of mind. Furthermore, Realists like Waltz believe that the reoccurrence of imperialism in history, from the times of Thucydides to the 15th and 16th century suggests “that there is an inner logic of domination in world affairs which proves power, like nature, abhors a vacuum” . Or in other words “weakness invites control” . In fact Robert Gilpin and Landes write about the disparity of power: when a nation finds itself in a vulnerable position, other nations will attempt to expand and take advantage of the weaker nation because there is a vacuum of power. Additionally, Rajan Menon and John Oneal come to the conclusion in their work titled Polity that “imperialism is due not to the order within states but the disorder among them.” What one can understand from their conclusion is that when a state finds itself in leadership, war, economic or other state of turmoil, there is a consequent vacuum of power within this disorder which leads to other power seeking nations attempting to dominate.

Both the Marxist and realist realm believe that the state is the primary actor in the world system. One of the biggest differences however is that Marxists generally think that the bourgeoisie’s opinion is what leads this state to act imperially and realists in majority believe that national interest is what drives them to act imperially. However, both are of the opinion that there is a constant move towards imperialism in this modern age- the Marxists believing in short that this occurs because of capitalist tendencies, while on the other hand realists believe it’s the natural tendencies of the stronger states to dominate and seek more power.

There are strong arguments from different political theories for there being imperialism in the modern world of today. However, the arguments dissolve when one takes the unusual position of thinkers such as Robert Cox, who are of the opinion that the primary actors in the international system have shifted from the state into economic institutions because of globalization. Their primary argument in its simplest suggests that as states have lost their complete sovereignty to the wide economic sphere and institutions, there cannot be imperialism: because imperialism requires that the state is the primary actor, for there to be center periphery relations. There are various critiques to this unconventional theory and they will also be touched upon.

Globalization has impacted greatly in the change of world order and has to a great extent challenged the “old Westphalian assumption that a state is a state is a state.” Indeed, to the prophets of globalization, “the Nation state ceases to be a political institution capable of exerting influences on the activities of capital” . In fact, Stephen Gill gives reference to various economic case studies to express that there cannot be an empire. Firstly, Stephen Gill writes about how the “US economy is losing its lead in Productivity” and this is a problem specially now since the US is relying on foreign finance from China and elsewhere to sustain a “level of military and civilian consumption that US production would otherwise not allow” . This leaves the nation in a vulnerable position, where its fate is in the hands of other nations. In other words the US success in the world stage could be blocked by other nations. Robert Cox questions how such an exposed state could be an imperial power? Secondly, Stephen Gill also brings an interesting point into the debate about the interlinked economy in the globalized world order. Gill claims that “more and more, national debts are foreign debts, so that states have to be more attentive to external bond markets and to externally-influenced interest rates in determining their own economic policies.” So in practical terms, each country involved in the global economy is directly affected by what happens in another nation regardless of how calculated and cautious they are in their own economics. This dissolves the realist idea that the state is the main actor in the system because a state has lost its power in controlling its economy and markets. This begs the question: if states have lost their economic control, then how can a nation in this modern globalized world be an Empire?
There are various critiques to this alternative theory on the world order besides the obvious Marxist and Realist critiques. In fact, Robert Giplin counter argues Stephen Gill and the ideas of Robert Cox by suggesting that the “role of the nation state in economics as well as in political life is increasing” instead of decreasing. Giplin explains that this happens because “multinational corporation(s) (are) actually a stimulant to the further extension of the state power in the economic realm” . Hence Giplin is of the opinion that nations are, as a matter of fact, gaining further autonomy. Moreover other critics sympathize that nations loose a reasonable amount of economic sovereignty with globalization. However, they criticize the argument by stating that it completely disregards the military. They believe that a nation can become an empire with military power. Such critics make reference to the US and the fact that they have military bases in 13 countries outside North America in key strategic geographic locations which in turn applies political pressure on neighboring countries. The last major criticism is that the work of Stephen Gill can seem contradictory. Gill writes that empires cannot evolve in this modern world. However, he must accept informal imperialism to some extent since in his work titled ‘Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations’ he recognizes that there are three macro-regional economic spheres in USA, Europe and in East Asia that dominate the economic world and have power over micro-regions.
This avant-garde view on the world order bears some interesting and valid points when one considers the economic sphere today- but it is flawed in that it is contradictory. Perhaps it is contradictory since it is perhaps a less explored view of the world order. However, what is interesting is that it turns away from the traditional thought that the state is all powerful, and turns to challenging persons to think of a more ‘Borderless’ world where institutions such as the United Nations or World Trade Organization are primary actors. In theory, if institutions are the primary actors, then imperialism is impossible since it requires states to be the primary actors.