“The Growth of International Organizations in the Modern Times Proves the Redundancy of Realist Theory” - Discussion

“International Institutions have become an increasingly common phenomenon of international life” . Today in this highly globalized world, most nation states are bound by various international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World bank and the United Nations. Not only are the numbers of institutions increasing, their role is growing. Indeed, Europe is experiencing the most “Extensive and well-developed” institution, binding countries and removing a part of each nations sovereignty. This phenomenon is highly contrary to the predictions made once by Mearsheimer that “the EC is likely [due to the end of the Cold War] to grow weaker, not stronger with time” and his prediction that NATO would disintegrate because “it is the Soviet Threat that holds NATO together” . Because of such pessimism portrayed by the realists, and with the growth in international organizations, neoliberal institutionalists have made the claim that the realist theory is becoming redundant. Massive debate about this subject has occurred between Mearsheimer and Crieco in the realist school of thought and Keohane, Axelrod and Scully in the neoliberal school of thought. In this particular debate the realist thinkers are generally of the opinion that realism is not in any shape or form redundant, in fact they claim that it is more powerful today. On the other hand the neoliberal institutionalists dispute that the realist theory is no longer explaining what is happening with interstate relations worldwide. This paper will attempt to discuss both sides of the debate in order to conclude if in fact the realist theory has become redundant today. It will hopefully become apparent that both theories are able to account for their “sides of the coin” to a high extent.

Before the debate can be discussed, it is important to briefly explain my reasoning for basing this paper on neoliberal institutionalism. After research, it becomes evident that the most “influential contemporary approach to international relations theory are neorealism and neoliberalism” . Indeed, Powell has accepted that a common place for an article “about some aspect of international relations theory to begin” is on this very debate between realism and neoliberalism. Also, Joseph Crieco has said that “the major challenger to realism has been what I shall call liberal institutionalism.” Hence it was only appropriate to try to examine this question with these two theories.

Realism has been characterized by many as grim and pessimistic. In fact, Wendt wrote that:

“Realism paints a rather grim picture of world politics. The international system is portrayed as a brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other, and therefore have little reason to trust each other. Daily life is essentially a struggle for power, where each state strives not only to be the most powerful actor in the system, but also to ensure that no other state achieves that lofty position”.

Being such a distrusting regime, it is true that the chance for cooperation, especially in an international sphere, becomes quite rare. However, realists like Crieco and Mearsheimer who have written specifically on realist theory on cooperation, are still of the opinion that there is a chance for cooperation if certain conditions are met. If these conditions are not met, an institution may still be formed, but its chances for disintegration will massively increase. This section will aim to discuss what realists think are the vital factors that allow cooperation to occur in order to suggest that realism is not redundant. Indeed, Crieco and Mearsheimer are grand supporters that realism prevails “the most powerful theory of international relations” . The arguments used by realists suggest that cooperation and the formation of international institutions comes down to a state’s self interest.

The first argument used by realists is that “States in a realist world...must be motivated primarily by relative gains concerns when considering cooperation” . What is meant by this is that the primary goal of states is not to make sure they achieve the best they possibly can from an institution, the goal is “to prevent others from achieving advances in their relative capabilities” . In the opinion of a realist, even if the state is losing in an organization, this doesn’t matter if the other contenders are doing worse. In fact, joining an institution, in the eyes of a realist is done simply to make sure one does better than the other nations. Indeed, “A state will decline to join, will leave, or will sharply limit its commitment to a cooperative arrangement if it believes that gaps in otherwise mutually positive gains favour partners” . Furthermore, J. Crieco also wrote an article about ways in which realism allows for cooperation, and he explained that sometimes one must join an international institution because of the consequences which follow if one does not. Crieco makes a reference to the scenario where if a state does not cooperate with others, “they may work together and gain even greater relative advantage over you than they might otherwise” .

The second point which is made by scholars like Mearsheimer, is that states may join institutions in order to secure the balance of power. In fact, “for realists, institutions reflect state calculations of self-interest based primarily on concerns about relative power; as a result, institutional outcomes invariably reflect the balance of power” . This is demonstrated by the UN for instance. In the UN the most important members are part of the Security Council, which inevitably means they carry more powers, since the Security Council tackles the most pressing issues. On the other hand, other less powerful nations only have membership in the general assembly which means that they only have a say in issues which aren’t in retrospect as important. Additionally, in the Security Council the big five, which consists of France, the United Kingdom, China, USA and the USSR, have Veto power. It is fair to suggest that it represents the balance of power of the time in which the UN was founded. Moreover, “realists recognize that great powers sometimes find institutions ... useful for maintaining or even increasing their share of the world power.” Indeed, Britain and France, who are no longer seen as superpowers were able to secure the balance of power of the late 1940’s to a high extent with the use of the United Nations. Helen Milner wrote about realism and the balance of power and concluded that “states will cooperate to counterbalance others whose relative power is growing” . This is supported with the United States and other European states in balancing against the soviets through NATO . This is further suggested by Snidal who wrote that “the less well united ones enemies, the safer on is.”

These are the two main arguments which are made by Mearsheimer and other realists to ensure that the realist thought is still the primary international relations theory. As one can deduct from the points said above, cooperation in the realist world comes down to self interest: The self interest may be securing the balance of power, or achieving better than other nations, or a countries security. De facto “when state elites do not foresee self-interested benefits from cooperation, we do not expect cooperation to occur” . To conclude the first side of the debate, the realists think their theory is more rounded then the theory of neoliberal institutionalism. The realists stress that there are two main restrictions to inter-state cooperation: The concern about cheating, and relative gains. “neoliberal institutionalism pays attention exclusively to the former, and is unable to identify, analyze, or account for the latter.” Mearsheimer attacks the neoliberal institutionalist school of thought of underestimating “the barriers to cooperation in the anarchic international system, in particular the inhibiting effect of relative-gains concerns”. By including such factors as relative gains into the formula, and by still being able to account for the growth in international institutions, the realists claim to be the mainstream theory in international relations today.

Realists have definitely supported and defended their position. However, the growth in international institutions does beg the question: how is it that institutions are growing at the rate that they are if the realist thought is correct. Particularly since the realist thought still claims that “international institutions affect the prospects of cooperation only marginally” . Neoliberal institutionalists argue that realists are not entirely correct. “The debate between neorealist’s and neoliberals has been based on the shared commitment to rationalism” and a shared belief that the international system has an anarchic nature. However, the two schools of thought differ in that neoliberal institutionalists aren’t as pessimistic as the realist theory and support cooperation with absolute gains instead of relative gains. This side of the debate is led by Scully, Keohane and Martin. Keohane and Martin have asked a defining question: “how are we to account for the willingness of major states to invest resources in expanding international institutions if such institutions are lacking in significance?” . In other words, they believe that the growth of international institutions is supporting their claim that “ even if the realists are correct in believing that anarchy constraints the willingness of states to cooperate, states nevertheless can work together and can do so especially with the assistance of international institutions” . The neoliberal institutionalists critique about the realist thought being redundant isn’t limited to the obvious fact that the there is a growth in international organizations. According to neoliberal institutionalists, there are further factors, which mark the termination of realist theory in international relations.

The first of these factors is the extreme pessimism of the realist theory which disables it from recognizing “the possibilities for international cooperation and the capacities of international institutions” . Firstly, in realism as in neoliberal institutionalism there is a concern about cheating. However, neoliberals generally argue that the fear of a partner cheating can be lowered with the aid of institutions. Indeed, Keohane has claimed that generally institutions “make it more sensible to cooperate by lowering the likelihood of being double-cross” . A common proposition of how this happens is since there is an increase in the information available about each state, and hence more transparency, this “reduces the likelihood that states will cheat on established agreements or norms.” Also, because of this transparency and increased information, and the agreements on rules, It is “easier to punish cheaters.” Crieco and Axelrod attempt to explain this: “international regimes do not substitute for reciprocity; rather, they reinforce and institutionalize it”, which means there are some rules in the playing field and it is therefore harder for countries to cheat. Lastly on this point of cheating, there are neoliberal instituionalists who think that the fear of cheating is worked out as in the prisoner’s dilemma. They explain that “states may pursue a strategy of tit-for-tat and cooperate on a conditional basis- that is, each adheres to its promises so long as partners do so.” Secondly, unlike for realism, neoliberal institutionalists do not take notice of relative gains in cooperation. However, they are of the opinion that just as institutions are able to “mitigate fears of cheating and so allow cooperation to emerge” , institutions can hypothetically lessen the fears which are associated with relative gains concerns. Neoliberal institutionalists infrequently and with less detail explain how this can occur, nonetheless, they make reference to the occasions in which “institutions led states to behave in a more cooperative manner than they otherwise might have” , which dampened relative gains concerns.

The second factor which suggests the end of realism in international relations on the subject of institutions and cooperation follows the discussion from above about relative gains. As explained above, neoliberal institutionalists think about absolute gains rather than relative gains when it comes to cooperation. Cooperation in the eyes of neoliberal institutionalists can only occur if there are shared mutual interests . Once countries are bound by an international cooperation where there are such shared common aspects, the interests of a state is thereafter to succeed absolute gains. Robert Powell explicates:

“Neoliberal institutionalism assumes that states focus primarily on their individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains of others. Whether cooperation results in a relative gain or loss is not very important to a state in neoliberal institutionalism so long as it brings an absolute gain”

Robert Powell is of the opinion that absolute gains unlike relative gains “emphasizes the prospects for cooperation” . This is because states which are concerned with relative gains will perceive the gains of another nation to be a loss for oneself and this will make it harder to cooperate positively and to achieve anything substantial and without considerable tensions. Additionally, absolute gains shifts the aim of states from competing for better results than its partners to just getting the best one can from cooperation: which henceforth allows for a successful cooperation. According to various neoliberal institutionalists, the UN wouldn’t have survived if nation-states were constantly calculating the relative gains to others. It is a known fact that different nations get different outcomes out of the UN, including a range of different powers. Developing countries like Zimbabwe and even developed countries like Germany don’t get as many powers as the United States of America or Britain. So, if nation states would be following the realist concern with relative gains, surely the UN wouldn’t have survived for as long as it has, through highly intense times like the Cold War.

To bring to a close, there are three major arguments portrayed by the neoliberal institutionalists which expresses their opinion of the redundancy of realist theory. The first argument was the obvious questioning of the realist thought on the grounds of ever growing international organizations. The second critique was towards realist pessimism and its blinding ability: for realists aren’t able to see the possibilities for international cooperation. The third and last argument was about absolute gains versus relative gains: how absolute gains render cooperation. One must conclude the second side of the debate with a final quote of Keohane: “realism’s insistence that institutions have only marginal effects renders its account of institutional creation incomplete and logically unsound, and leaves it without a plausible account of the investments that states have made in such international institutions as the EU, NATO, GATT, and regional trading organizations.”

Is the realist theory relevant today? It is interesting to attempt to answer this question with reference to both neoliberal institutionalism and the realist theory; because the former is relatively new. In fact it arguably was born with the writing of Keohane around two decades ago. The latter on the other hand has been around for longer and has hence been further developed. I think that it is important to recognize that the theories have been developed at different times, because it is reflected on the answer to the debate. I am of the opinion that the realist thought is to a high extent still relevant today: I think that realists are correct in their assumption about institutions reflecting the balance of power. This happens because power is generally distributed according to power and size of nations, as it is done in the UN and EU. Also, many a times it is the more developed nations which create such institutions: this was done in the League of Nations for instance. I also agree that states will not join an institution if it does not aid in securing its own interests. Moreover, it is harder to discuss the relative gains arguments versus absolute gains because both schools of thought have defended their opinions to a great extent. I agree that cooperation with relative gains concerns happens when the more powerful states want to secure their part of world power, and hence are concerned with up and coming nations. However, I also agree cooperation with absolute gains concerns occurs with most developing and weaker developed nations, who just aim to succeed the best they possibly can: neoliberal institutionalists demonstrate this with the UN example mentioned earlier. Furthermore, what leads one to question the realist thought is the extreme pessimism which doesn’t match up to the growth of international organizations. On the other hand, neoliberal institutionalism seems rather new, and has many incomplete analysis´s , but is able to account for the growth in institutions. This question will be an interesting one to answer with the further development of institutions and with the further development of both theories hand in hand. Overall, it seems too harsh a statement to claim that realism in international relations is redundant.